PROTESTS, THE PRESS, AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS BEFORE AND
AFTER THE “FLOYD CASELAW”
Peter Jacobs*
INTRODUCTION
CNN reporter Omar Jimenez was standing in the middle of an empty
street, holding a microphone, wearing a press pass, and speaking directly into
a professional-grade video camera when he was arrested by Minneapolis
police officers. In footage of his arrest, presumably seen live by millions of
households tuned in to CNN to watch coverage of the unfolding protests
following George Floyd’s death, Jimenez clearly identifies himself and his
camera crew to police officers. Nevertheless, he is led away in handcuffs.1
Two days later, Andrea Sahouri was pepper sprayed by police and
arrested while covering a Black Lives Matter protest in Des Moines, Iowa.
Sahouri, a reporter for the Des Moines Register, wasn’t wearing a press
badge but announced herself to police at the scene—“I’m press, I’m press,”
she said, right before she was pepper sprayed. While recovering, she told the
officer “I’m just doing my job. I’m a journalist,” which was confirmed by
her boyfriend at the time and a colleague, who displayed her own press
badge.2 Despite her identification, Sahouri was arrested and charged with
failing to disperse and interfering with official acts. This was the rare press
case where the charges actually stuck, despite wide-spread condemnation of
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CNN, Police Arrest CNN Correspondent Omar Jimenez and Crew on Live Television, YOUTUBE (May 29,
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William Morris, ‘This Is My Job!’: Register Reporter Andrea Sahouri Testifies in Her Own Defense in Her
Second Day on Trial, DES MOINES REGISTER (Mar. 9, 2021, 6:43 AM),
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P3J-TEMJ].
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the First Amendment implications of putting a journalist on trial for their
coverage of a protest.3
“I’m a reporter, bro,” Gustavo Martínez Contreras told police officers as
he was arrested while covering a protest in Asbury Park, New Jersey, the
following night.4 Martínez Contreras, a reporter for the Asbury Park Press,
had every reason to expect to not be a police target. Although the town had
put a curfew in place, journalists were expressly exempted from the order—
which is why Martínez Contreras “wore his brightly colored press badges on
a lanyard around his neck all night, so there would be no question that he
was one such reporter,” according to a lawsuit filed after the charges against
him for failure to disperse were dropped. 5
These are just a few of the more than 100 journalists around the country
who were arrested while on the job in 2020.6 As protests following the
murder of George Floyd engulfed the country, Americans watched in shock
as members of the press were beaten, fired upon, and arrested while covering
mass demonstrations.7 These arrests, in particular, stood out as “a blatant
violation of constitutional protections and long-standing ground rules that
guide interactions between media and law enforcement officials.”8 Even as
charges against these reporters have largely been dropped, several members
of the media have fired back, filing lawsuits asserting the constitutional rights
guaranteed by federal civil rights statutes.9 The cases that emerged from
these protests—what one federal judge termed the “Floyd Caselaw”10—all
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In March 2021, an Iowa jury acquitted Sahouri in under two hours.
Complaint at 3, Martínez v. City of Asbury Park, No. 3:20-CV-08710-AET-DEA, 2021 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 43944 (D.N.J. July 13, 2020).
Id. at 2.
Jessica Jerreat, At Least 117 Journalists Detained, Arrested Covering US Protests This Year, VOICE OF AM.
(Dec. 14, 2020, 8:08 PM), https://www.voanews.com/press-freedom/least-117-journalistsdetained-arrested-covering-us-protests-year [https://perma.cc/FJL3-FETM].
See, e.g., Paul Farhi & Elahe Izadi, ‘The Norms Have Broken Down’: Shock as Journalists Are Arrested, Injured
by Police While Trying to Cover the Story, WASH. POST (May 31, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/journalists-at-several-protests-were-injuredarrested-by-police-while-trying-to-cover-the-story/2020/05/31/bfbc322a-a342-11ea-b6193f9133bbb482_story.html [https://perma.cc/6MEL-FNHR] (noting that an MSNBC anchor
reporting in Minneapolis was hit by rubber bullets fired by police).
Id.
E.g., Woodstock v. City of Portland, No. 3:20-CV-01035-BR., 2020 WL 3524230 (D. Or. June 8,
2020) (bringing § 1983 actions against Portland Police Department for disturbing and assaulting
media members while reporting).
Alsaada v. City of Columbus, No. 2:20-CV-3431, 2021 WL 1725554, at *26 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30,
2021) (“Since the last year’s protests in the wake of George Floyd’s killing, there have been no fewer
than seventy-three cases exploring how these protests shine a light on existing First Amendment or
Fourth Amendment principles. (‘Floyd Caselaw’).”).
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present “a similar tale” about the state of First Amendment rights in
America.11 Taken as a whole, these decisions may signal a broader
acceptance of judicially-recognized press rights.
The professional press were not the only groups potentially targeted by
police while attending protests, however. Legal observers,12 citizen
journalists,13 and protest medics14 have all asserted that law enforcement
retaliated against them for First Amendment protected conduct. Individuals
deprived of their constitutional rights can bring a claim against state agents
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, including an allegation that an official arrested them
in retaliation for First Amendment protected conduct.15
Generally, plaintiffs seeking to bring a § 1983 First Amendment
retaliatory arrest lawsuit need to prove three elements—1) that the plaintiff
was actually engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, 2) the plaintiff
suffered some sort of injury connected to this conduct, and 3) a state actor
caused this injury because of a retaliatory motive.16 As detailed below, the
Supreme Court’s holding in Nieves v. Bartlett established a fairly high bar for
plaintiffs bringing these lawsuits, as they now need to prove there was no
probable cause for their arrest.17
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Jake Offenhartz, “Round Up The Green Hats”: NYPD Accused Of Deliberately Targeting Legal Observers in
Brutal
Bronx
Mass
Arrest,
GOTHAMIST
(June
8,
2020,
9:13
PM),
https://gothamist.com/news/round-green-hats-nypd-accused-deliberately-targeting-legalobservers-brutal-bronx-mass-arrest [https://perma.cc/RZV9-2S2K].
Complaint at 26, Hall v. Warren, No. 6:21 Civ. 06296 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 05, 2021) (alleging that
police “targeted and shot at . . . people who were recording officers,” such as the plaintiff).
Melissa Gira Grant & Katie McDonough, Protest Medics on Being Targeted by the Police, in Their Own
Words, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/157985/protest-medicstargeted-police-words [https://perma.cc/FL5W-NX36].
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (“‘[T]he First Amendment prohibits government
officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions’ for engaging in protected speech. . . .
[T]he injured person may generally seek relief by bringing a First Amendment claim.”’).
See, e.g., Hartman v. Thompson, 931 F.3d 471, 484 (6th Cir. 2019) (“A claim of First Amendment
retaliation requires proof that: ‘(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action
was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between’ the first two elements, i.e. ‘the
adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff’s protected conduct.’’’) (quoting
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999); DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942
F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019) (“To state a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
generally must show: (1) she engaged in constitutionally protected speech, such as her right to
petition the government for redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected that
protected speech and right to petition; and (3) a causal connection exists between the defendant’s
retaliatory conduct and the adverse effect on the plaintiff’s speech and right to petition.”).
See Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1723 (establishing that plaintiffs bringing First Amendment retaliatory arrest
claims must prove that there was no probable cause for their arrest).
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These groups face two major impediments to vindicating these attacks on
their constitutional rights. For one, they have to navigate an uncertain legal
landscape surrounding the right to report on and observe police activity
under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court—as well as several circuit
courts—has not acknowledged this right.18 While it seems that every circuit
court that has encountered the question has determined the right exists, the
contours and scope of it are still to be widely accepted.19 Is this right based
on speech and expressive conduct, or does it derive from the right to access
information? How it is defined will have implications for who can
successfully state a claim for First Amendment retaliation.
Second, these plaintiffs must overcome a Supreme Court-mandated
barrier to First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims. In Nieves v. Bartlett, the
Court established that, as a general rule, plaintiffs seeking to bring a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim need to prove that there was no
probable cause for the officer’s action.20 This, as will be explained below, is
a hard bar to reach.
The good news for these plaintiffs is the second prong—concerning injury
to the individual engaged in protected conduct—is comparatively
straightforward. Plaintiffs typically either need to show they suffered a direct
harm or that their protected speech was chilled. In First Amendment
retaliation cases, the arrest itself is typically considered evidence that a
plaintiff’s speech was chilled.21 “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for
even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury,”
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Christina Murray, Cameras Down, Hands Up: How the Supreme Court Chilled the Development of the First
Amendment Right to Record the Police, 71 MERCER L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2020) (“Of the nation’s thirteen
federal circuit appellate courts, only six have unequivocally recognized a citizen’s First Amendment
right to record the police as they conduct their public duties.”).
See, e.g., Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (“The dearth of detail about the
contours of the right announced in Smith undermines any claim that it provides officers ‘fair
warning’ under other circumstances.”) (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333
(11th Cir. 2000).
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1723 (agreeing with defendants’ argument that the “no-probable-cause
requirement should apply to First Amendment retaliatory arrest claims.”).
See, e.g., Hoyland v. McMenomy, 869 F.3d 644, 657 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here can be little doubt
that ‘being arrested for exercising the right to free speech would chill a person of ordinary firmness
from exercising that right in the future.’”); Sexton v. City of Colorado Springs, No. 20-CV-00108PAB-KMT, 2021 WL 1210375, at *12 (D. Colo. Mar. 31, 2021) (“[A] retaliatory arrest
unsupported by probable cause is an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness.”);
Hartley v. Wilfert, 918 F. Supp. 2d 45, 52 (D.D.C. 2013) (compiling “substantial caselaw in which
the threat of an arrest—even in the absence of an actual arrest—is sufficient to chill speech, in
violation of the First Amendment.”) (emphasis in original).
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according to the Supreme Court.22 As long as the plaintiff will be able to
show that their conduct was protected by the First Amendment, a retaliatory
arrest claim should qualify as harm.
Even before the emergence of the “Floyd Caselaw,” professional
journalists could assert a strong case against these arrests—finding that their
First Amendment rights are protected and there may not be probable cause
to arrest members of the press at protests. Other groups, however, including
legal observers, citizen journalists, and protest medics, faced hurdles that
could halt their claims. Part I of this paper examines Nieves v. Bartlett and
explains why this paper focuses on the professional press. Part II outlines the
constitutional right at issue for non-participants at a protest, using recent
“right to record” cases as a stand-in for a general right to engage with matters
of public importance. Part III charts two paths for individuals to push back
on the Nieves “no probable cause” requirement. Part IV evaluates the
strengths and weaknesses of several non-participant groups’ First
Amendment retaliation claims following the framework established for
professional journalists.
Part V unpacks new First Amendment
developments arising from the “Floyd Caselaw,” including trends in
municipal Monell claims and injunctive relief.
I.

NIEVES V. BARTLETT AND PROTECTING THE PRESS

In 2019, the Supreme Court released their decision in a landmark § 1983
retaliatory arrest case, Nieves v. Bartlett. The case centered around a man,
Russell Bartlett, who was charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest
while attending a “raucous” weeklong festival in Alaska.23 He subsequently
alleged his arrest was in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right
to free speech, based on a confrontation with the arresting officers.24 In the
Court’s opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts established a general rule that
probable cause should defeat a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim.25
As Roberts writes, “[b]ecause there was probable cause to arrest Bartlett, his
retaliatory arrest claim fails as a matter of law.”26
Succinctly summing up the impact of the ruling, one lower court notes,
“Nieves makes clear that a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim fails
22
23
24
25
26

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (citing Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1717.
Id. at 1721.
Id. at 1723.
Id. at 1728.
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when probable cause—an objectively reasonable legal justification for the
arrest—is evident.”27 Framed another way, plaintiffs seeking a § 1983
retaliatory arrest claim must now prove that the defendant officer did not
have probable cause to pursue an arrest for any crime.28
The case has special resonance for the press.29 The late Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, in her partial concurrence to the Court’s ruling, issued a
warning that Nieves will leave members of the press “with little protection
against police suppression of their speech.”30 The case’s sole dissenter, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, was more explicit about the decision’s impact on First
Amendment rights, using the case of a hypothetical citizen journalist arrested
for trespassing for stepping onto someone’s front yard while filming a
homeowner’s fiery confrontation with the police.31 Under the Nieves rule,
Sotomayor asks, “Will this citizen journalist have an opportunity to prove
that the arrest violated her First Amendment rights?”32
Nieves already has new relevance as journalists across the country push
back against seemingly retaliatory arrests they suffered during the summer of
2020. Specific, credible allegations and evidence entered into courtrooms
around the country make it clear that journalists were targeted—both with
force and with arrest—during protests that year.
Following George Floyd’s death while in the custody of the Minneapolis
Police Department, numerous journalists traveled to report on the protests
in the city. One of these journalists was Linda Tirado, who—while reporting
on the protests—was left permanently blind in one eye after she was shot
with a foam bullet by a police officer. She subsequently brought a claim
against the city and certain police officers under § 1983. The details of
Tirado’s experiences reporting on the protests in Minneapolis, as well as
those of other journalists, were “serious and troubling,” according to the
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Bello Reyes v. McAleenan, No. 19-CV-03630-SK, 2019 WL 5214051, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 16,
2019).
First Amendment–Nieves v. Bartlett, 133 HARV. L. REV. 272 (2019).
See Clay Calvert, Dissent, Disagreement and Doctrinal Disarray: Free Expression and the Roberts Court in 2020,
28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 865, 892 (2020) (“[T]he Nieves rule is both journalistically and
constitutionally important.”); John S. Clayton, Policing the Press: Retaliatory Arrests of Newsgatherers After
Nieves v. Bartlett, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 2275, 2275 (2020) (“The ruling threatens the ability
of journalists to bring viable civil claims to help deter pretextual arrests, since probable cause for
some minor offense will often be easy to articulate.”).
Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1735 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 1740 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
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court.33 Though the incidents were not identical, the court acknowledged a
series of similar experiences where journalists faced police misconduct—
“journalists were identifiable as press, separated from protestors and at a
distance from police, and were not engaging in any threatening or unlawful
conduct.”34 Taken as a whole, these police encounters may establish an
unconstitutional custom in Minneapolis of “targeting journalists for unlawful
reprisals” during the George Floyd protests.35
The Black Lives Matter protests spurred by George Floyd’s death were
not limited to Minneapolis, however. A line of cases from Portland, Oregon
brought by publisher Index Newspapers demonstrates the animus that
journalists faced while covering protests in that city. The court found a
pattern of journalists being singled out for doing their jobs. Even during
peaceful demonstrations, the court wrote, “the record is replete with
instances in which members of the press were targeted.”36 The court
highlighted at least forty-five examples of law enforcement using unlawful
force against clearly-identified members of the press—these instances
“provide exceptionally strong evidentiary support” for the finding that law
enforcement members “were motivated to target journalists in retaliation for
plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights.”37
Just from the cases that are currently moving forward in the federal
courts, it’s clear that journalists across the country have valid reasons to bring
First Amendment retaliation claims for the harm and arrests they suffered
covering protests in 2020. Because of their clearly defined role, cases
involving arrests of journalists typically feature particularly “compelling”
facts for finding a constitutional violation and a lack of probable cause.38
These press cases are often used to model a particular right available to the
33

34
35
36
37
38

Tirado v. City of Minneapolis, 521 F. Supp. 3d 833, 846 (D. Minn. 2021). While Tirado’s lawsuit
only alleges incidents of unlawful showings of force against journalists, rather than arrests, the
substance of the claims could easily apply to journalists who faced unlawful arrests. Tirado even
alleges that her backpack was “hit with a bright green ballistic tracking round”—“used to designate
individuals for arrest”—during the protests. Id. at 837.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 846.
Index Newspapers v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 834 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 829.
See, e.g., Molina v. City of St. Louis, No. 4:17-CV-2498, 2021 WL 1222432, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Mar.
31, 2021) (finding that the facts in a previous First Amendment retaliation case were especially
“compelling” in establishing a right without clear precedent in the circuit because the plaintiffs were
journalists, but confirming that the First Amendment “applies with equal force to citizens.”);
Stolarik v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-5858, 2017 WL 4712423, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017)
(finding that a group of cases “‘clearly foreshadowed’ the right of journalists—if not all citizens—to
record (photograph) police activity in public.”).
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public or create a framework to articulate a constitutional claim. For
example, in evaluating a First Amendment right to film police activity, one
circuit court noted, “[a]s no doubt the press has this right, so does the
public.”39
The Supreme Court has been clear, however, “that
the organized press has a monopoly neither on the First Amendment nor on
the ability to enlighten”40—“As indispensable as is the role of the press in a
free society, journalists and the media have ‘no special immunity from the
application of general laws.’”41 Put another way, a journalist does not possess
any “special privilege” just for doing their job.42 To be sure, there are many
situations where a reporter’s status as a member of the press is not a defense
of any sort to an arrest or legal justification for their actions.43 Journalists
have no right to trespass on private property.44 Journalists also have no right
to enter an area—however newsworthy it may be—where the general public
is barred.45 And, journalists certainly have no right to interfere with or
impede ongoing police activity.46
Although not cloaked with any unique constitutional protections,
journalists have an acknowledged role to play in a “free society”—“to
provide an independent source of information so that a citizen can make
informed decisions.”47 In this role, the professional press are generally
“surrogates for the public.”48 The Supreme Court has noted that journalists
39
40
41

42
43

44

45
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47
48

Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 359 (3d Cir. 2017).
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 773 (1985).
Mosely v. City of Chicago, 252 F.R.D. 421, 426 (N.D. Ill. 2008), order vacated in part on reconsideration
sub nom. Mosley v. City of Chicago, 252 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972)).
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1034 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
E.g., Hendricks v. Pierce County, No. C13-5690, 2014 WL 1053318, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 19,
2014) (“[Plaintiff’s] claimed status as a journalist does not give her the unfettered right to document,
or even watch, any interaction she desires, and she has not plausibly plead that it does.”).
E.g., Skvorak v. Thurston County, No. C05-5100, 2006 WL 8455147, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. Sept.
15, 2006) (rejecting an argument that plaintiffs, as reporters covering a protest, were “entitled to
special consideration” and instead finding that there was probable cause for the arrests because the
journalists “remained unlawfully on private property”—“The owner of the property had not given
plaintiffs permission to be on the property, whether they were members of the press or not.”).
See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–85 (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes
of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.”).
E.g., Cobarobio v. Midland County, No. MO:13-CV-00111, 2015 WL 13608102, at *27 (W.D.
Tex. Jan. 7, 2015), aff’d, 695 F. App’x 88 (5th Cir. 2017) (“This Court finds, while there may indeed
be a First Amendment right to photograph an active crime scene, it does not include intruding onto
that crime scene or interfering with police and first responders in the performance of their duties
during an emergency.”).
Dean v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012).
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are “a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs”
and “informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences.”49 Indeed,
the press’ right of access is particularly “important”—“In a society in which
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at
first hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the
press.”50 Therefore, the press must be allowed “maximum freedom.”51
Courts have also acknowledged that government officials may be
motivated to go after the press because of their reporting.52 Just as with any
individual or group, “journalists should not be targeted and penalized on the
basis of their associations or content of their expression.”53 As one circuit
court notes, “[w]hen wrongdoing is underway, officials have great incentive
to blindfold the watchful eyes of the Fourth Estate.”54
This judicially recognized and defined role is distinct from other groups
who may seek to bring First Amendment retaliation claims, such as legal
observers. As one circuit court notes, while “case law has frequently observed
the importance of the press as surrogates for the public,” the court had “not
considered whether legal observers serve the same function.”55 The judges
left the question open.56
Similarly, although the Supreme Court has remarked that in the modern
world “the line between the media and others who wish to comment on
political and social issues becomes far more blurred”57—due to the rise of the
Internet and the decline of traditional print and broadcast media—citizen
journalists and bystanders may not share the same presumptions about
dissemination of information that protect some journalistic conduct as
49
50
51
52

53
54
55
56
57

Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 908 F.3d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Cox Broad. Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491–92 (1975)).
Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
See Koala v. Khosla, 931 F.3d 887, 907 n.3 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Although the [Supreme] Court has
said that ‘the institutional press’ enjoys no ‘constitutional privilege beyond that of other
speakers,’ . . . it has long treated discrimination against the press as constitutionally suspect.”)
(quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010)); Villarreal v. City of Laredo, Texas,
No. 20-CV-40359, 2021 WL 5049281, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 1, 2021) (“It should be obvious to any
reasonable police officer that locking up a journalist for asking a question violates the First
Amendment.”).
Guan v. Mayorkas, No. 19-CV-6570, 2021 WL 1210295, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2021).
Leigh v. Salazar, 677 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2012).
Index Newspapers v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 825 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020).
Id.
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472
U.S. 749, 782 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Owing to transformations in the technological and
economic structure of the communications industry, there has been an increasing convergence of
what might be labeled ‘media’ and ‘nonmedia.’”).
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expressive speech.58 Protest medics—who almost universally do not benefit
from a judicially-recognized distinct role—face similar issues.59
Looking outside of case law, established norms and customs across the
country make it clear that journalists carry certain presumptions about their
behavior and role when reporting on a protest. “Reporters have a
fundamental right to cover the demonstrations we’re seeing in Delaware and
across our country,” Delaware governor John Carney said in a statement
following the arrest of a reporter covering a protest in his state in 2020.60
“They should not be arrested for doing their jobs,” Carney said. “That’s not
acceptable.”61
Arkansas governor Asa Hutchinson echoed this sentiment, stating during
a news conference that journalists “should not be arrested.”62 “When they’re
identified as a journalist, obviously, they should go about their business,”
Hutchinson said, following the detention of several journalists at protests in
Arkansas the same year.63 Notably, Carney is a Democrat from a solidly blue
state and Hutchinson is a Republican from a solidly red state.
In practice, this sentiment has manifested in various governmental
systems that create special exemptions and advantages for the press.
Legislators and regulations recognize “that effective newsgathering requires
greater levels of access than what the First Amendment provides,” according
to a Harvard University report on media credentials.64 It is normal for
government policies, therefore, to grant the press “certain privileges to do
things that ordinary citizens may not.”65 General curfew orders exempting
58

59

60

61
62

63
64

65

See Cummins v. Bat World Sanctuary, No. 02-12-00285-CV, 2015 WL 1641144, at *8 (Tex. App.
Apr. 9, 2015) (noting that while the press serves an “important purpose” “entitling it to special
protections under the First Amendment,” “private citizens now have a greater ability to also serve
that role, though usually to a lesser degree”).
See, e.g., Wise v. City of Portland, 483 F. Supp. 3d 956, 967 (D. Or. 2020) (“Nowhere did the court
recognize that participating in a protest as a medic is a distinct type of expressive conduct.”) (citing
Abay v. City of Denver, 445 F. Supp. 3d 1286 (D. Colo. 2020)).
Governor John Carney (@JohnCarneyDE), TWITTER (June 9, 2020, 9:35 PM),
https://twitter.com/JohnCarneyDE/status/1270529883299631104 [https://perma.cc/K46DGBXZ].
Id.
Brent Renaud, KATV Journalist Detained While Livestreaming Little Rock Protests, U.S. PRESS FREEDOM
TRACKER (June 2, 2020), https://pressfreedomtracker.us/all-incidents/katv-journalist-detainedwhile-livestreaming-little-rock-protests/ [https://perma.cc/J3AD-YR4G].
Id.
Jeffrey Hermes, John Wihbey, Reynol Junco & Osman Tolga Aricak, Who Gets a Press Pass? Media
Credentialing Practices in the United States, SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. POL’Y (June
2014),
https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Press-Pass-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E59P-MXSB].
Id.
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journalists, for example, demonstrate that “state and local governments have
concluded that press access . . . is both important and workable.”66
Another such privilege is the issuance of press passes or other credentials,
which may allow reporters access to certain areas or conjure up presumptions
of journalistic independence when reporting in the field.67 Federal, state, and
local government officials “routinely provide the press with special rights of
access to government-controlled information and places,” notes the
University of Georgia School of Law’s Sonja R. West.68 These credentials
offer the press unique access to everything from government buildings, press
conferences, and other non-public spaces to executions, military operations,
and crime and disaster scenes.69 When reporting from a protest, press passes
were traditionally viewed as “powerful symbols of neutrality that helped
protect journalists.”70
Importantly for this paper, the dispersal orders and other ordinances
typically at issue in cases involving protests tend to exempt the press.71 As
noted above, many of the recent journalist arrests that led to § 1983 lawsuits
occurred in jurisdictions where press had been exempted from generally
applicable curfews.72 This was typical of the protests that spread across the
country in 2020.73 As the New York Times reported in June of that year,
cities across the country “recognized the special status of journalists by
exempting them from the curfews that have gone into effect in recent days.”74

66
67

68
69
70

71

72
73

74

Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, 338 F.R.D. 109, 117 (D. Minn. 2021).
Genevra Kay Loveland, Comment, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms,
53 TEX. L. REV. 1440, 1460 (1975) (“The press has the same right of access [as the public], similarly
subject to police power restrictions; however police often allow reporters preferential access through
the issuance of press passes.”).
Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 91, 119 (2018).
Id.
Press Pass Offering Little Defense for Journalists Caught in the U.S. Fray, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 3, 2020),
https://www.tampabay.com/news/nation-world/2020/06/03/press-pass-offering-little-defensefor-journalists-caught-in-the-us-fray/ [https://perma.cc/L9S7-VLMD].
E.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting an exemption for
credentialed press members from a government order prohibiting access to certain municipal areas
in the face of protests).
E.g., Sasso v. City of Dall., No. 3:20-CV-1398-S, 2020 WL 2839217, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 1, 2020)
(exempting “members of the news media” from a curfew).
See Jennifer M. Kinsley, Black Speech Matters, 59 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2020) (noting that
although “[m]any cities responded to the protests by enacting and enforcing overnight curfews”
orders such as the one in Cincinnati exempted members of the press as “essential workers.”).
Marc Tracy, A.C.L.U. Sues Minneapolis, Claiming Police Tactics Violated Freedom of Press, N.Y. TIMES
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/03/business/aclu-sues-policeminneapolis.html [https://perma.cc/6TYS-DTGH].
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Similar considerations have been enshrined in statute, as well as
government orders.75 California’s penal code, for example, allows “a duly
authorized representative of any news service, newspaper, or radio or
television station or network” to enter areas otherwise closed due to a riot or
other civil disobedience.76 Similarly, Seattle’s municipal code creates a press
exemption for failure to disperse orders, stating that these orders do not apply
“to a news reporter or other person observing or recording the events on
behalf of the public press or other news media.”77
Although the below analysis will focus on the professional press, this
paper will later address whether other groups—such as legal observers,
citizen journalists, and protest medics—can effectively utilize a similar
framework.78
II. WHAT IS PROTECTED WHEN REPORTING ON, RECORDING, OR
OBSERVING POLICE ACTION?
What is the reporter doing when they anchor a broadcast from the
middle of a protest, or focus their camera on a police officer, or just jot down
notes to potentially use in a future story? Is this different than the legal
observer who monitors how police interact with the public, or the citizen
journalist who walks by and whips out their phone to record something that
catches their eye?
Courts inevitably face these questions when defining the precise First
Amendment right raised by a retaliatory arrest claim. Broadly, these
plaintiffs posit that they’re engaging with police activity—a matter of public
interest—either by reporting, recording, or just watching. Although the
specific rights at play may not be found in the text of the constitution itself,
the Supreme Court has noted that the First Amendment is “broad enough
to encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enumerated in the
very terms of the Amendment, are nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment
of other First Amendment rights.”79
75

76
77
78

79

E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–71–206 (B) (1975) (establishing a defense to prosecution for “the offense
of failure to disperse” if the arrested individual is “a news reporter or other person observing or
recording the events on behalf of the news media”).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 409.5 (d) (West 1997).
SEATTLE MUN. CODE 12A.12.020 (A) (1973).
For an argument that “courts should create a legal observer exemption from
police dispersal orders,” see Erica D. Lunderman, Protecting the Protectors: Preserving and Enhancing the
Rights of Legal Observers, 21 MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. *29 (2020).
Globe Newspaper v. Sup. Ct. Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (discussing a constitutional
“right of access to criminal trials”).
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Courts typically classify this protected First Amendment right in one of
two distinct ways.80 In one line of cases, courts have found that the plaintiff
is engaging in “expressive conduct,” akin to some form of speech. This
conduct is protected, according to these cases, because as speech it is
concerned with the communication of ideas and dissemination of
information. Other courts, however, have found that the plaintiffs are
invoking their right to acquire information. The protected conduct that falls
under this banner seems to be broader than just speech and other expressive
conduct.
Although the rights at issue in discussions of “freedom of expression” and
“access to information” are both “rooted in First Amendment principles,”
the cases have “developed along distinctly different lines.”81 While most
decisions seem to draw from both lines of cases,82 some have declared that
the right fits solely within one camp. This not only has implications for the
scope and definition of the right,83 but also may impact whose conduct is
actually protected.
For example, a case arising from the Occupy Wall Street protests,
Higginbotham v. City of New York, found that recording a protest is protected
under the First Amendment as “an essential step towards an expressive
activity.”84 The court, however, attributed the right to conduct “performed
by a professional journalist who intends, at the time of recording, to
disseminate the product of his work”—implying that this protection might
not exist for parties who are not planning to disseminate the information.85
By contrast, when courts have framed the right as concerning access to
information, as in Glik v. Cunniffe, it made no difference that the plaintiff was
“a private individual, and not a reporter, gathering information about public
officials.”86 Rather, the court established, the “First Amendment right to
gather news”—derived from the public’s right of access to information—is
“not one that inures solely to the benefit of the news media.”87
80
81
82
83

84
85
86
87

See, e.g., Knight v. Montgomery Cnty., 470 F. Supp. 3d 760, 765 (M.D. Tenn. 2020).
S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553, 559 (6th Cir. 2007).
See, e.g., Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 688–89 (5th Cir. 2017).
Stephanie Johnson, Comment, Legal Limbo: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Turner v. Driver Fails to
Clarify the Contours of the Public’s First Amendment Right to Record the Police, 59 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 245,
261 (2018) (“The Fifth Circuit established that the public has a First Amendment right to video
record the police without adding any context or support to that right, outside First Amendment
principles.”).
Higginbotham v. City of N.Y., 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Id.
Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2011).
Id.
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A. Protected expressive conduct
The First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information . . . is essential to the welfare of the public.”88
Generally, “the creation and dissemination of information are speech within
the meaning of the First Amendment” and therefore subject to certain
protections.89 Where there is a “mutual desire to communicate” between the
press and their source, “news gathering and news dissemination cannot be
disassociated.”90
Assuming that photographing and filming are expressive—and therefore
are protected by the First Amendment91—“it is difficult to see why that
protection should disappear simply because their subject is public police
activity.”92 Under this line of cases, the First Amendment protects “the
recording of matters of public interest” as the “creation of speech.”93
One circuit court has emphasized the expressive qualities of the “First
Amendment right to film matters of public interest”—“decisions about
content, composition, lighting, volume, and angles, among others, are
expressive in the same way as the written word or a musical score.”94
Another circuit proposes a simple analogy to explain the protections on
recording. The court notes that “banning photography or note-taking at a
public event would raise serious First Amendment concerns” because of its
impact on how that information may be distributed.95 That law “would
obviously affect the right to publish the resulting photograph or disseminate
a report derived from the notes.”96 For this same reason, recording matters
of public interest must be protected.
Certain circuits seem to place this right primarily, if not solely, within the
expressive conduct framework. When the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the
right in a 2012 case, American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois v. Alvarez, the court

88
89
90
91

92
93
94
95
96

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552, 570 (2011).
Washington Post v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 770, 773–74 (D.D.C. 1972).
See Ness v. City of Bloomington, 11 F.4th 914, 923 (8th Cir. 2021) (“The acts of taking photographs
and recording videos are entitled to First Amendment protection because they are an important
stage of the speech process that ends with the dissemination of information about a public
controversy.”)
Higginbotham v. City of New York, 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
M.C. Through Chudley v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 363 F. Supp. 3d 1182,
1195, 2012 (D. Kan. 2019).
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1203 (9th Cir. 2018).
ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 596.
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wrote that, “the act of making [a] recording is necessarily included within the
First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the
right to disseminate the resulting recording.”97 In a more recent case, the
circuit reaffirmed that “gathering information for news dissemination” is a
First Amendment-protected form of expressive activity.98
Framed
differently, the Eighth Circuit found that photography or recording
“unrelated to an expressive purpose . . . may not receive First Amendment
protection.”99
B. The right to acquire information
“Members of an organized society, united for their common good” have
a “natural right” to “acquire information.”100 The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the Constitution protects the right to “receive
information” as the First Amendment protects the right to “receive
information and ideas.”101
This reading is by definition broader than the scope of expressive
conduct—because the First Amendment “embraces the right to distribute
literature,” it also “necessarily protects the right to receive it.”102 The
“peripheral rights” that derive from the First Amendment—“the right to
receive” and “freedom of inquiry”—make the specific constitutional rights
from the freedom of speech and press more secure.103
These cases describing the First Amendment’s “right of access to
information” establish that the public has a right to record matters of public
interest.104 As one court notes—“The First Amendment protects the right to
gather information about what public officials do on public property, and
specifically, a right to record matters of public interest. Pretty simple rule.”105

97
98
99

100
101
102
103
104

105

Id. at 595 (emphasis in original).
John K. MacIver Inst. for Pub. Pol’y v. Evers, No. 20-1814, 2021 WL 1324386, at *5 (7th Cir.
2021).
Ness v. City of Bloomington, 11 F.4th 914, 923 (8th Cir. 2021); but see Chestnut v. Wallace, 947
F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2020) (finding a “clearly established” constitutional right “to watch policecitizen interactions at a distance” in the Eighth Circuit).
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
Martin v. City of Struthers, Ohio, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965).
Fields v. City of Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 353, 360 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that “the First Amendment’s
right of access to information” grants the public the “right to record—photograph, film, or audio
record—police officers conducting official police activity in public areas”).
Dunn v. City of Fort Valley, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 1354 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (citing Smith, 212 F.3d
at 1333).
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Courts have engaged in a continuing set of steps to spin out this right
from the text of the constitution. In the 1970s, the Supreme Court concluded
that because the First Amendment protects freedom of the press there must
be “some protection for seeking out the news.”106 Over the first few decades
of the 21st Century, circuit courts have extended this logic, finding that if
there is a “right to gather news,” protections must also exist for recording
matters of public interest—such as government officials on the job—to create
the news itself.107 To take this analysis one step further, “if the constitution
protects one who records police activity, then surely it protects one who
merely observes it—a necessary prerequisite to recording.”108
Certain circuits have established that this right to engage with matters of
public interest derives solely from citizen’s access to information. The Third
Circuit, in Fields v. City of Philadelphia, found that this right “falls squarely
within the First Amendment right of access to information” protected by the
Constitution even “absent some sort of expressive intent.”109 The First
Amendment, the circuit found, “goes beyond protection of the press and the
self-expression of individuals” to protect “the public’s right of access to
information about their officials’ public activities.”110
C. Journalists and protected conduct
The First Amendment “protects the media’s right to gather news.”111 It
is “beyond dispute” that “journalists actively reporting a news event” are
engaged in First Amendment protected conduct.112 This conduct is
protected regardless of whether it derives from protections on expressive
activity, or the right to acquire information.

106
107

108
109
110
111

112

Branzburg v. Hayes et al. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
Dyer v. Smith, No. 3:19-CV-921, 2021 WL 694811, at *7 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2021) (compiling
circuit court decisions); see also Fields, 862 F.3d at 358 (“The First Amendment protects actual
photos, videos, and recordings . . . and for this protection to have meaning the Amendment must
also protect the act of creating that material.”).
Chestnut v. Wallace, 947 F.3d 1085, 1090 (8th Cir. 2020).
Fields, 862 F.3d at 362.
Id. at 359 (citing First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Bowens v. Superintendent
of Miami South Beach Police Dep’t, 557 F. App’x 857, 863 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that “a
member of the press plausibly states a First Amendment violation by alleging he was arrested for
taking photographs of alleged police misconduct and police then deleted the photographs he
took.”).
Quraishi v. St. Charles County, Missouri, No. 4:16-CV-1320 NAB, 2019 WL 2423321, at *6 (E.D.
Mo. June 10, 2019), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, No. 19-2462, 2021 WL 278347 (8th Cir.
Jan. 28, 2021).
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Under an expressive activity framing that draws on information
dissemination, the “foundational principle” of the First Amendment’s press
clause is that “the media serves the public” by offering information for
citizens to consume.113 Courts have routinely found that journalists who
clearly self-identified as a member of the press create a reasonable belief that
they are inhabiting the unique role of the press and plan to disseminate the
information they are gathering.114
This has often taken on particular importance in protest cases.115 In
Burdett v. Reynoso, a reporter “wearing a press pass around his neck” and
filming an arrest made it apparent “to even a casual observer” that he was
engaging in specific protected First Amendment activities.116 Similarly, in
Benjamin v. Peterson, the court found it would be reasonable to conclude that
“officers should have been on notice” an individual was engaged in protected
activity because he “was wearing press credentials, was carrying a video
camera, and identified himself as ‘media.’”117
The press also engage in protected conduct when they merely collect and
document information. In Index Newspapers v. City of Portland, the court found
that members of the press engaged in constitutionally protected activity
under the First Amendment by “newsgathering, documenting, and recording
government conduct” during protests.118
Index Newspapers expanded on the media’s unique role in acquiring
information during a protest, noting, “the point of a journalist observing and
documenting government action is to record whether the ‘closing’ of public
streets (e.g., declaring a riot) is lawfully originated and lawfully carried out.”119
Without journalists on the scene, the court wrote, “there is only the
government’s side of the story to explain why a ‘riot’ was declared and . . .
whether law enforcement acted properly in effectuating that order.”120

113
114

115

116
117
118
119
120

Alaska Landmine v. Dunleavy, No. 3:20-CV-00311-JMK, 2021 WL 686931, at *7 (D. Alaska Jan.
22, 2021).
E.g., Garcia v. Montgomery County, Maryland, 145 F. Supp. 3d 492, 524 (D. Md. 2015) (finding
that a videographer “audibly [identifying] himself as a member of the press . . . would support the
reasonable belief that [he] intended to disseminate his recording to the public.”).
E.g., Tirado v. City of Minneapolis, 521 F. Supp. 3d 833, 836 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding that a
journalist “was identifiable as a member of the press because she wore a standard reflective press
credential around her neck [and] carried a professional-grade camera and lens.”).
Burdett v. Reynoso, No. C-06-00720 JCS, 2007 WL 2429426, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23,
2007), aff’d 399 F. App’x 276 (9th Cir. 2010).
Benjamin v. Peterson, No. 12220 DWF/SER, 2013 WL 3097271, at *6 (D. Minn. June 18, 2013).
Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1142 (D. Or. 2020).
Id. at 1146.
Id.
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III. PROVING THE CAUSAL CONNECTION AND ARGUING AGAINST
PROBABLE CAUSE
The final element a plaintiff needs to prove for a First Amendment
retaliatory arrest claim is that they suffered a harm because of some
retaliatory motivation by a state actor. This “but-for causation” is often
difficult to prove, but as the Supreme Court notes in Nieves, probable cause
“speaks to the objective reasonableness of an arrest.”121 If there was probable
cause for an arrest, it’s likely that it was not caused due to a retaliatory
motivation, according to the Court.122 A demonstration that there was no
probable cause, however, provides “weighty evidence that the officer’s
animus caused the arrest.”123
On its face, the Nieves decision appears to be a significant barrier for
journalists—as well as other supposed non-protestors at a protest—bringing
a retaliatory arrest case.124 Meyers v. City of New York, a case arising from the
2011 Occupy Wall Street demonstrations that was subsequently analyzed
under Nieves, demonstrates the potential problem these would-be plaintiffs
face with protests and probable cause.125 In a Second Circuit decision, the
Meyers judges note that protestors’ “refusal to comply with that lawful
dispersal order supplied probable cause to arrest them for disorderly
conduct,” which in turn invoked Nieves’s barrier to retaliatory arrest claims.126
Similarly, the probable cause argument for arresting anyone at a protest
seems straightforward—a dispersal order was issued, certain journalists, legal
observers, or other individuals did not disperse, and they were therefore
arrested.127 As Northern Kentucky University’s Jennifer Kinsley notes, “By

121
122
123
124

125
126
127

Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1724 (2019).
Id.
Id.
First Amendment—Freedom of Speech—Retaliatory Arrest—Nieves v. Bartlett, 133 HARV. L. REV. 272,
279 (2019) (arguing that Nieves “may authorize retaliatory arrests for engaging in certain protected
activities . . . because such retaliatory arrests are commonplace”) (emphasis in original); John S.
Clayton, Policing the Press: Retaliatory Arrests of Newsgatherers After Nieves v. Bartlett, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 2275, 2288 (2020) (“At protests in particular, it is likely that almost any person present—
including a newsgatherer—is ‘guilty of some minor infraction.’ Thus, while a journalist at a protest
may not need to ask ‘permission’ to gather news, they nonetheless rely on a favorable exercise of
discretion by police to not arrest or otherwise interfere with the reporting process—even when such
interference may serve the state’s interest.”).
Meyers v. City of N.Y., 812 F. App’x 11, 14–15 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id.
Cervantes v. San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman, No. 17-CV-01230-BAS-AHG, 2020
WL 5759752, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff “has not shown the absence
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declaring a curfew and arresting those in violation of it, lawmakers have
transformed otherwise constitutionally-protected political expression into
criminal activity.”128
Notably, the “state of mind” of an individual arrested at a protest—
whether that person believed “they were participating in a sanctioned, First–
Amendment–protected” activity or intentionally breaking the law—is
“irrelevant to the question of probable cause.”129 Where there is otherwise
probable cause for the arrest, a plaintiff’s “status as a ‘participant’ or member
of the press does not affect the outcome of [the] case.”130
This analysis, however, ignores an open question that has arisen
repeatedly in cases where journalists, legal observers, and other groups faced
arrest while reporting on and monitoring protests. In short, as teased but not
answered in a 2020 federal court ruling, does an otherwise peaceful and lawabiding individual engaged in certain constitutionally protected
conduct need to stop doing their job when faced with a seemingly lawful
general dispersal order?131
This thorny subject has been raised as both a matter of constitutional
rights and statutory interpretation. When courts have previously grappled
with this issue, other concerns—such as a separate justification for the
arrest132 or pre-existing legal circumstances that make the problem
superfluous133—often allow judges to circumvent making a ruling one way
or the other.134

128
129
130
131

132

133
134

of probable cause for his arrest because City Defendants had probable cause to arrest [him] for
failing to disperse.”); Owen v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 465 F. Supp. 3d 267, 277 (W.D.N.Y. 2020)
(“[T]he police had probable cause to arrest [plaintiff] and take him into custody for disorderly
conduct. Even if they did not have probable cause to arrest him for that offense, they had probable
cause to arrest and take him into custody for simply disobeying the lawful order of a police officer.”).
Jennifer M. Kinsley, Black Speech Matters, 59 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 1, 11 (2020).
Garcia v. Bloomberg, 662 F. App’x 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2016).
Skvorak v. Thurston Cnty., No. C05-5100 RBL, 2006 WL 8455147, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15,
2006).
Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1126 (D. Or. 2020); but see
Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We are sensitive
to journalists’ constitutional right to investigate and publish exposés on [matters of public
importance] . . . . However, the First Amendment right to gather news within legal bounds does
not exempt journalists from laws of general applicability.”).
Higginbotham v. City of N.Y., 105 F. Supp. 3d 369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (passing on resolving
whether a journalist covering a protest is “congregating” with protesters due to probable cause
based on a separate unlawful act).
Index Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1126 (citing a preliminary injunction already in place).
But see Wise v. City of Portland, 483 F. Supp. 3d 956, 962 (D. Or. 2020) (considering and rejecting
“the narrow issue of whether protest medics . . . should effectively receive special dispensation under
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Assuming for the purposes of this paper, however, that there is no general
exemption to dispersal orders or special rights for non-protestors at a protest,
these groups have two potential ways to fulfil the third prong of the First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim. A plaintiff can either argue that their
arrest fits into the narrow exemption the Supreme Court articulated to Nieves’
probable cause requirement, or they can argue that there was no probable
cause for their arrest, as a matter of law.
A. The Nieves exemption
In Nieves, the Supreme Court outlines a “a narrow qualification” that is
effectively an exemption from the “no-probable cause” requirement.135 This
exemption, the Court notes, should be evoked in “circumstances where
officers have probable cause to make arrests, but typically exercise their
discretion not to do so.”136 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
describes a hypothetical jaywalker who is arrested after complaining about
police conduct.137 As jaywalkers are not typically arrested, the argument
goes, this person should not have their First Amendment claim thrown out
based on a weak version of probable cause.
In her dissent in Nieves, Justice Sotomayor critiques the “clarity” of the
probable cause exemption. “What exactly the Court means by ‘objective
evidence,’ ‘otherwise similarly situated,’ and ‘the same sort of protected
speech’ is far from clear,” she writes.138 Justice Neil Gorsuch also appears to
argue that the new standard is open to interpretation—citing a previous case
to note that the Court “seems to indicate that something like Armstrong’s
standard might govern a retaliatory arrest claim when probable cause exists
to support an arrest.”139 Both Justices express hope that lower courts follow
this rule “commonsensically.”140

135
136
137

138
139
140

the First Amendment to remain in areas where police have issued lawful dispersal orders,” citing
practical and constitutional reasons.)
Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019).
Id.
Id. (“If an individual who has been vocally complaining about police conduct is arrested for
jaywalking at such an intersection, it would seem insufficiently protective of First Amendment rights
to dismiss the individual’s retaliatory arrest claim on the ground that there was undoubted probable
cause for the arrest.”).
Id. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1733 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 1741 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting). There is some indication that courts have taken these concerns to heart. See, e.g., Lund
v. City of Rockford, Ill., 956 F.3d 938, 945 (7th Cir. 2020) (“We agree with Justice Gorsuch’s
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Courts appear to have approached the Nieves exemption in two ways—
one narrow and one more broad. In the narrow interpretation of the
exemption, courts focus on whether the plaintiff can point to
contemporaneous evidence that similarly situated persons not engaged in
protected speech were not arrested. In Owen v. City of Buffalo, New York, for
example, a street preacher arrested outside of a Donald Trump rally was not
able to invoke the Nieves exemption because there was no evidence “that
other individuals who, like him, lacked a ticket for the Trump rally were,
unlike him, not arrested after refusing to leave the no-protest zone.”141 Here,
the court focused only on the single Trump rally in question.
The broad approach, however, seems to follow Justice Gorsuch’s and
Justice Sotomayor’s commonsense plea, as courts look to a practice or history
of not arresting the type of person in question. In Ballentine v. Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department, a group of activists was arrested for placing
graffiti after using chalk to write messages outside a law enforcement
agency.142 As the judge writes in Ballentine, “Nieves directs me to look to
whether Metro officers typically arrest individuals for chalking on
sidewalks.”143 The court found that the plaintiff could invoke the Nieves
exemption because there was no evidence that the police department “ever
arrested anyone besides the plaintiffs for chalking on the sidewalk.”144 In
Ballentine, the focus was on the overall practice of the police, not a single
incident.
Looking specifically at cases involving mass arrests for failure to disperse
at a protest, courts have employed both the narrow and the broad
approaches. In Meyers, described above, the court wrote the Nieves exemption
“exists where there is ‘objective evidence’ that the police refrained from

141
142
143

144

interpretation of the majority opinion in Nieves; the majority does not appear to be adopting a rigid
rule that requires, in all cases, a particular form of comparison-based evidence . . . . [W]e surmise
that Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor are correct—common sense must prevail.”); McKenzie v.
City of N.Y., No. 17 Civ. 4899 (PAE), 2019 WL 3288267, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2019) (stating
that evidence for the Nieves exemption “could potentially include admissions by officers, statistical
evidence of the arrest rates for the offense in question, or other direct evidence.”) (citing Nieves, 139
S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019) (opinions of Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part and
Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
Owen v. City of Buffalo, N.Y., 465 F. Supp. 3d 267, 275 (W.D.N.Y. 2020).
Ballentine v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1113–14 (D. Nev. 2020), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part and remanded sub nom. Ballentine v. Tucker, 28 F.4th 54 (9th Cir. 2022)
Id. at 1116; see also Castro v. Salinas, No. 5:18-CV-00312-JKP-ESC, 2020 WL 3403071, at *5
(W.D. Tex. June 19, 2020) (finding that, to invoke the Nieves exemption, a plaintiff alleging
retaliatory arrest needs to show evidence that “police officers routinely do not arrest persons” for
the offense in question).
Ballentine, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1115.
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arresting similarly situated people not engaged in speech.”145 The phrasing
“the police refrained” seems to define it specifically as examining police
action at the time of the arrest. This reading is supported by the evidence
the court highlights—in the case, which was about Occupy Wall Street
protestors, no facts could support the Nieves exemption because “the NYPD
arrested ‘everyone who remained in the Park’ following the dispersal
order.”146 The court, it seems, was solely looking at the events of that
evening.
Conversely, in Cervantes v. San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman, which
concerned a legal observer at a protest outside a Trump rally, the court took
the broad approach. Unlike the Meyers court, which just looked at the one
protest, here the court articulated the Nieves exemption as needing “objective
evidence that police have ‘typically exercised their discretion’ not to arrest
others similarly situated” to the arrested individual.147 Applied to the case,
this would have allowed the plaintiff to show that “legal observers who
publicly challenge police conduct in their capacity as attorneys” are not
typically arrested at protests.148 The court was looking for a typical practice
of the police, not just the one Trump rally in the case.
1. Journalists and the Nieves exemption
Few cases involving journalists have been analyzed under the Nieves
exemption. Nigro v. City of New York, however, involved a professional
journalist and photographer who was arrested during a protest against thenpresidential candidate Donald Trump in 2016.149 He claimed that the
arrest—for disorderly conduct and jaywalking—was in retaliation for his
First Amendment protected conduct, as he was photographing police
officers.
The court found his case “troubling” and wrote that the allegations raise
“the specter of a police officer singling out a member of the media in
retaliation for his First Amendment activity.”150 While the plaintiff’s arrest
took place before the Supreme Court ruled on this issue, the court noted that
145
146
147
148
149

150

Meyers, 812 F. App’x at 15.
Id.
Cervantes v. San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman, No. 17-CV-01230-BAS-AHG, 2020
WL 5759752, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020).
Id.
Nigro v. City of New York, No. 19-CV-2369, 2020 WL 5503539, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2020).
While the incident in the case took place before Nieves was decided and, therefore, would not impact
the district court’s decision, the judge still undertook a Nieves analysis as a thought experiment.
Id. at *7.
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his “retaliatory arrest claim would seem to fall squarely within the Nieves
exemption.”151
The case also seemed to validate the Justices’ fears about the potential
impact on the press—the court made a point that “it was precisely facts like
those alleged here that caused the Supreme Court concern in Nieves.”152 This
exemption may be a lifeline for members of the media bringing similar claims
in the future.
B. The path to arguing against probable cause runs through the “individualized
suspicion” requirement
A constitutional requirement mandated by the Fourth Amendment,
probable cause rests on “a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”153 This
generally requires individualized suspicion that a specific person has broken
the law.154 An individualized probable cause requirement can get somewhat
fuzzy in a mass arrest situation, such as protests.155 Individualized suspicion,
however, is still needed to establish probable cause for an arrest, even in the
mayhem of a protest.156
As probable cause is a reasonableness analysis, specific circumstances are
given weight when determining an individual’s guilt. For instance, the court
in Dinler v. City of New York cited dispersal orders’ importance in “making such
individualized determinations of probable cause” during a protest.157
Officers, however, are still expected to ensure an individual’s likely guilt

151
152
153

154

155
156

157

Id. at *4.
Id. at *7.
U.S. Const. art. IV; Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (“the probable-cause standard
is a ‘“practical, nontechnical conception’” that deals with “‘the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act’”).
See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, What Is Probable Cause, and Why Should We Care?: The Costs, Benefits, and
Meaning of Individualized Suspicion, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 146 (2010); Karen J. Pita
Loor, Tear Gas + Water Hoses + Dispersal Orders: The Fourth Amendment Endorses Brutality in Protest Policing,
100 B.U. L. REV. 817, 847 (2020) (arguing that a group probable cause standard for protestors
“substantially deviates from and is inconsistent with traditional individualized determinations of
suspicion.”).
Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-7921, 2012 WL 4513352, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012)
(assessing and rejecting “a theory of collective or group” probable cause).
See Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352, at *6 (finding that individualized probable cause “remains the
lodestar” even “in a large, and potentially chaotic, group setting.”); see also Amanda Peters, Mass
Arrests & the Particularized Probable Cause Requirement, 60 B.C. L. Rev. 217, 269 (2019) (“Supreme
Court opinions addressing probable cause in multi-suspect searches and arrests . . . reiterate that
probable cause must be particularized. This fact alone settles the area of law and puts it beyond
the realm of debate.”).
Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352, at *6.
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before making an arrest. In Hickey v. City of Seattle, the court found that
“without individualized investigation,” officers at the scene of a protest
“could not distinguish which of the protestors had committed or were
committing arrestable offenses.”158
C. A clearly identified member of the press should enjoy protection against individualized
suspicion
Although the Supreme Court has long maintained a broad and open
interpretation of the First Amendment’s press clause,159 the 1960s and 1970s
may have been the reporters’ legal “Glory Days”—both for the cases the
Court took on and the way Justices described the professional press.160
During this period, Justice Potter Stewart was arguably the highest-profile
advocate for a distinct set of press rights that should be available to
professional journalists.161 Writing in a concurrence in Houchins v. KQED, a
1978 case about press access to a county jail, Justice Stewart makes two
arguments on behalf of the press, one constitutional and one practical.
It is “no constitutional accident” that the First Amendment “speaks
separately of freedom of speech and freedom of the press,” according to
Stewart.162 This distinction is rather “an acknowledgment of the critical role
played by the press in American society.”163 His practical argument, drawing
from this constitutional analysis, posits that, therefore, “equal access” to
information “must be accorded more flexibility in order to accommodate the
practical distinctions between the press and the general public.”164

158

159

160

161

162
163
164

Hickey v. City of Seattle, No. C00-1672, 2006 WL 3692658, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 13, 2006);
Dinler, 2012 WL 4513352, at *6 (“police efforts to sort lawbreakers from bystanders . . . are highly
probative of whether it would be reasonable to conclude that every person arrested violated the
law.”).
Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 n.3 (1942) (“The protection of the First
Amendment . . . is not limited to the Blackstonian idea that freedom of the press means only
freedom from restraint prior to publication.”)
RonNell Andersen Jones, What the Supreme Court Thinks of the Press and Why It Matters, 66 ALA. L. REV.
253, 255–56 (2014); see also Mary-Rose Papandrea, Protecting the Role of the Press During Times of Crisis,
61 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1161 (2020) (arguing that “courts have continued to embrace the
largely press-protective interpretation of the First Amendment that arose . . . in the 1960s and
1970s.”).
Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press”, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975) (“The primary purpose of the
constitutional guarantee of a free press was a similar one: to create a fourth institution outside the
Government as an additional check on the three official branches.”).
Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 16.
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Justice Stewart’s view—which has both its champions165 and critics166—
has been repudiated in the courts as a matter of constitutional rights.167
However, his argument framing the press as a separate entity from the public
with a distinct role has, directly or not, likely impacted how courts approach
the question of probable cause as it relates to journalists.
The case Sennett v. United States provides a helpful example of Justice
Stewart’s view in action.168 Laura Sennett, a photojournalist “specializing in
the coverage of demonstrations, protests, and grassroots activism,” was
investigated by police after photographing a demonstration.169 Sennett,
notably, “did not display any press credentials” or carry any professional
photographic equipment—in fact, she was dressed like the “vandals” she was
documenting. She then argued that her status as a journalist should exempt
her from the criminal statutes she may have broken. The court found that
“common sense flatly precludes” this reasoning—“a person’s status as a
journalist . . . does not immunize the person from the strictures of the
criminal law.”170
However, the lack of rights that stem from being a journalist “does not
mean that a person’s status or occupation as a journalist is never relevant to
the probable cause calculus,” according to the court.171 Rather, “the fact
that a person is a photojournalist who records demonstrations” should
always be considered and—in certain cases—may be evidence that
“precludes a probable cause finding.”172
This distinction between

165

166

167

168
169
170
171
172

Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 563, 564 (1979) (arguing that “the press is ‘different’ from ‘everyone’; that it is, in a variety
of circumstances, entitled to constitutional treatment distinct from that generally afforded those
who exercise their freedom of expression; and that the nature of the treatment should largely be as
urged in the provocative articulations of Justice Potter Stewart.”).
Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press As an Industry, or for the Press As A Technology? From the Framing to
Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 464 (2012) (arguing for a “press-as-technology reading” of the First
Amendment, “under which all users of mass communications technologies have the same freedom
of the press.”).
See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (noting that “generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news.”); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310, 352
(“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional
privilege beyond that of other speakers.”)
Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2012). Although Sennett’s case concerned her
Privacy Protection Act rights, the probable cause reasoning is still relevant to this paper.
Sennett v. United States, 778 F. Supp. 2d 655, 657 (E.D. Va. 2011), aff’d, 667 F.3d 531 (4th Cir.
2012).
Id. at 666.
Id. at 666 n.21.
Id.
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constitutional rights and what is reasonable to expect for a probable cause
determination is how many courts have approached the issue of journalist
arrests at a protest.
Contemporary constitutional law establishes that the press does not
possess any rights of access distinct from the general public.173 Setting aside
for purposes of this paper whether or not this is the correct interpretation of
the First Amendment,174 it would not be an effective argument for journalists
to claim an innate right to go where protestors or the general public cannot.
It is true, however, that journalists and protestors are distinct groups who
draw on different rights when engaging in protected activity.175 The George
Floyd protests in 2020—and the court decisions that followed—highlighted
the split between the two groups. For instance, in Abay v. City of Denver, the
court specified that officers’ weapons and tactics impacted not only
protestors’ ability to demonstrate peacefully, but also “the media’s ability to
document the demonstration.”176 The Abay court also found it is “clearly in
the public interest” to protect both of these separate and distinct rights.177
More specifically, protestors draw upon the First Amendment to make
their voices heard. In Denver, for example, protestors exercised “the
constitutional right of the public to speak against widespread injustice,”178
while those who marched in Seattle “were engaged in the constitutional right
to protest police brutality.”179 As a practical matter, the press do not protest.
Not only is this against longstanding journalistic standards,180 but it is also

173

174

175
176
177
178
179
180

See, e.g., Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684–85 (“Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the
scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded.”); BH Media Grp., Inc. v. Clarke,
466 F. Supp. 3d 553, 660 (E.D. Va. 2020) (“[T]he First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the
press has traditionally focused on the right of the press to publish information without government
restraint, rather than on the acquisition of the information in the first place.”)
See, e.g., Sonja R. West, Favoring the Press, 106 Cal. L. Rev. 91, 95 (2018) (claiming “the text, history,
and spirit of the First Amendment’s Press Clause” allows the government to “treat press speakers
differently”)
De Jonge v. State of Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“The right of peaceable assembly is a right
cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”)
Abay, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 1293
Id.
Id. at 1294
Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County. v. City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department, 466 F. Supp.
3d 1206, 1213 (W.D. Wash. 2020).
See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Ethical Journalism Handbook, https://www.nytimes.com/editorialstandards/ethical-journalism.html [https://perma.cc/M8TT-PRUH] (last visited Jan. 20, 2022)
(“Staff members may not march or rally in support of public causes or movements”).
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documented in federal court rulings following protests.181 Courts repeatedly
stress that it is reasonable for police to recognize this distinction when
determining probable cause and arresting individuals present at a protest. In
many cases, a reporter’s status as a member of the press makes it
unreasonable to arrest them and may preclude a finding of probable cause.
In Landers v. City of New York, for example, the court was “skeptical” that a
reporter wearing a visible press credential while covering a Black Lives
Matter demonstration could “properly [be] considered a participant.”182
Similarly, Index Newspapers highlights “the constitutionally protected
newsgathering, documenting, and observing work of journalists . . . who
peacefully stand or walk on city streets and sidewalks during a protest.”183
Effectively, it is unreasonable for police officers to link journalists to the
protestors they are covering. “It cannot be seriously contended,” one court
writes, that “covering the march as a journalist . . . makes the observer part
of a ‘unit’ that is parading unlawfully.”184 As another court notes, when an
officer knows an individual at a protest is a journalist, that officer can’t
reasonably believe the journalist “intended to aid the protesters in some
way.”185
1. Is there probable cause to arrest a journalist covering a protest?
Not only are members of the press reasonably distinct from protestors
who may be the target of a dispersal order,186 but journalists carry a

181

182
183
184

185
186

See, e.g., Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2021 WL 5003065, at
*13 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2021), superseded sub nom. Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302
(WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 370161 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2022) (“Generally, members of the press are in
proximity to a protest to observe, record, and report about the protest, not to participate in the
assembly.”)(emphasis in original).
Landers v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-5176PKCCLP, 2019 WL 1317382, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
22, 2019).
Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1125 (D. Or. 2020).
Dinler v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-7921, 2012 WL 4513352, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2012)
(distinguishing between “photographers and journalists covering the march” and “the marchers
themselves”).
Eberhard v. California Highway Patrol, No. 3:14-CV-01910-JD, 2015 WL 6871750, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 9, 2015).
Berg v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. 20-CV-7870 DMG (PDX), 2021 WL 4691154, at *12 (C.D. Cal.
May 28, 2021) (noting that “at demonstrations where orders to disperse were given and flouted, the
use of injurious less-lethal force on peaceful protesters, and especially on journalists . . . , is not justified
by a strong government interest”) (emphasis added).
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presumption against violent activity due to their professional status.187
Courts have found that, because it is reasonable to assume that a person
clearly marked as press is not participating in the protest, they are likely not
contributing to any rioting, violence, or other illegal activity.
Benjamin v. Peterson, a case concerning a journalist’s arrest at the 2008
Republican National Convention, demonstrates how an officer’s initially
reasonable belief that an individual was “part of a rioting crowd” could
become unreasonable when that person identified themselves as a member
of the press.188 The Benjamin court found that the reasonableness of the arrest
could be called into question because the reporter “declared that he was
‘media’ and was wearing press credentials that were visible to
the arresting officers.”189
Similarly, the Index Newspapers decisions distinguishes between journalists
and other people in the area of the protest, in a way that implies certain
presumptions for members of the press. The Index Newspapers court stated
that the existence of “some violent offenders” does not give government
agents “carte blanche to attack journalists . . . and infringe their First
Amendment rights.”190 Furthermore, the court wrote, “The fact that a few
people may have engaged in some unlawful conduct does not outweigh the
important First Amendment rights of journalists.”191 An individual’s status
as a member of the press signifies that they are not “violent offenders” or
engaged in “unlawful conduct.”
IV. OTHER GROUPS—LEGAL OBSERVERS, CITIZEN JOURNALISTS, AND
PROTEST MEDICS
On its face, the argument for journalists seeking to bring a First
Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under § 1983 seems strong. Members
of the press have a First Amendment right to report under either framing of
the protection, they can show clear injury if arrested, and they have a good

187

188
189
190
191

See, e.g., Asociacion De Periodistas De Puerto Rico v. Mueller, 680 F.3d 70, 82 (1st Cir. 2012) (“A reasonable
agent could reasonably have believed that some number of non-journalists had entered [an
apartment complex] . . . based in part on intimations and evidence that some members of the crowd
were angry or hostile”).
Benjamin v. Peterson, No. 12-CV-220 DWF/SER, 2013 WL 3097271, at *4 (D. Minn. June 18,
2013).
Id.
Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1143 (D. Or. 2020).
Id. at 1155.
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argument against a finding of probable cause to escape the Nieves bar (or they
may be able to invoke the case’s exemption).
Journalists, however, are not the only individuals that have recently
drawn attention after facing arrest for potentially protected activity at a
protest. Local governments have also recognized the distinct role that groups
such as legal observers or protest medics play, carving out certain protections
from the police.192 Additionally, individuals acting as medics and legal
observers have been able to show that their protected speech was chilled as
the result of police action.193
Following the model articulated above with respect to professional
journalists, there are two questions that need to be answered about these
groups in order to determine whether an individual would be able to bring a
claim for First Amendment retaliatory arrest. One, is their conduct protected
under both readings of the First Amendment right to engage with matters of
public interest? These groups may run into problems if courts look for
expressive conduct. Two, is the potential plaintiff so clearly distinguishable
from a protestor that it would be unreasonable to arrest them? Each group
faces questions about whether their activity is really that distinct from that of
a protestor.
A. Legal observers—protected conduct and probable cause
In the Index Newspaper cases, a series of courts have found that legal
observers share the same First Amendment rights as journalists covering a
protest—like the professional press, these observers are “engaged in
newsgathering, documenting, and recording government conduct.”194 As
these courts have fleshed out, the First Amendment protects individuals
observing government conduct under the right of access to information.195
In a similar case, a court found that legal observers at a protest
“undoubtedly” engage in activity protected by the First Amendment because
the right to “monitor police conduct is a core constitutional right.”196

192
193

194
195
196

Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County, 406 F. Supp 3d. at 1211 (where an injunction was amended to
add “certain protections for journalists, medics, and legal observers”).
See, e.g., Breathe v. City of Detroit, 484 F. Supp. 3d 511, 518 (E.D. Mich. 2020), order clarified, No. 2012363, 2020 WL 8575150 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2020); Downes-Covington v. Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep’t, No. 220 Civ. 01790GMNDJA, 2020 WL 7408725, at *7 (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 2020).
Index Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d. at 1124.
Id.
Cervantes v. San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman, No. 17-CV-01230-BAS-AHG, 2020
WL 5759752, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020)
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However, when courts frame the First Amendment protection as one
concerned with expressive conduct, observers at a protest may fall short of
being able to assert their rights. As one court has held, observing
demonstrators and police at a protest “is conduct with little or no expressive
content” and, therefore, “is afforded no particular protection by the First
Amendment.”197
Importantly, many legal observers assert that they attend protests and
demonstrations to “serve as a ‘legal observer,’ but not as a participant.”198
These lawyers attend protests “for the sole purpose of observation.”199
Additionally, like members of the professional press, legal observers tend to
visually distinguish themselves when observing a protest. Lawyers associated
with the National Lawyers Guild, for example, wear bright clothing and
badges to identify themselves.200 Police officers have acknowledged that
these indicia signify that the individual is a legal observer.201 As noted above,
at least one court has articulated that legal observers are a distinct enough
group to qualify for Nieves’s similarly-situated probable cause exemption.202
Courts, however, have also not been clear as to whether legal observers
are so distinct from protestors that it should impact a probable cause analysis.
“[T]he goals, rights and obligations of legal observers do not always overlap
with those who are protesting,” although they may sometimes.203 While
some courts have found that “the roles of a legal observer and a protestor are
distinct,”204 drawing on different First Amendment protections, other courts
have found that it’s not enough for a lawyer to allege to attend a protest “in
the capacity of an observer . . . as observation and participation are not
mutually exclusive.”205
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Pesola v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-1917 (PKC)(SN), 2016 WL 1267797, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2016).
Dubner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 962 (9th Cir. 2001).
Downes-Covington v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, No. 220-CV-01790GMNDJA, 2020 WL
7408725, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 17, 2020).
Collins v. City of New York, 295 F. Supp. 3d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id.
Cervantes v. San Diego Police Chief Shelley Zimmerman, No. 17-CV-01230-BAS-AHG, 2020
WL 5759752, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2020).
Chua v. City of Los Angeles, No. LA CV16-00237, 2017 WL 10776036, at *14 (C.D. Cal. May
25, 2017).
Id. at *9.
People v. Cohen, 800 N.Y.S.2d 352, 2005 WL 293510, at *4 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005).
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B. Citizen journalists—protected conduct and probable cause
The rights of a citizen journalist at a protest—basically, any individual
present who chooses to record or watch—seem to turn explicitly on how
courts define that First Amendment activity. Crucially for claiming
protection under an expressive conduct framework, courts have found that
the mantle of “citizen journalist” does not imply the individual would
disseminate the information, in the same way a journalist likely would. In
Pluma v. City of New York, for example, a self-described “’citizen journalist’”
brought a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim after he was harmed
while taking photos and video of police action at an Occupy Wall Street
gathering.206 Noting that the plaintiff went to Zuccotti Park “with hopeful
reflection upon the efforts of Occupy Wall Street,” the court found that his
filming was only potentially expressive.207
Other courts, however, have recognized that the First Amendment
protects any citizen filming police activity and misconduct, linking this to the
press’ “vitally important role in holding the government accountable.”208
Courts have also recognized “the First Amendment rights of the audience”
observing a protest, because such bystanders—regardless if they even invoke
the title of “citizen journalist”—have a “primary interest” in access to
“readily available” information.209 In MacNamara v. City of New York, for
example, the court found that the First Amendment “protects and promotes”
bystanders at a demonstration, such as a man riding his bike home from a
play who stopped to observe the crowd at a political protest and was
subsequently arrested by police in a mass arrest.210
In some cases, courts have linked “citizen journalists” to other protestors,
while in others courts have evoked the language around the rights of
“newsmen.” For example, in Cobarobio v. Midland County, a line of cases about
a self-described “citizen journalist” who was arrested while photographing
the site of a deadly train crash, courts appeared to take his claim at face value
and framed the allegations against police as a matter of the “First
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Pluma v. City of New York, No. 13 Civ. 2017 (LAP), 2015 WL 1623828, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2015).
Id. at *7.
Index Newspapers v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 977 F.3d 817, 831 (9th Cir. 2020).
MacNamara v. City of New York, 275 F.R.D. 125, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 133–34, 141 (“Although [Randall] Steketee explained that he was not participating in any
protest or demonstration, he was arrested, handcuffed, and transported to Pier 57, where he was
detained for approximately 33 hours.”).

622

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:2

Amendment right of the press” (although one court did compare the plaintiff
to “real journalists”).211
On the other hand, recording protests events on a cellphone can be
someone’s “chosen form of protest.”212 In Sullivan v. Metropolitan Transit
Authority Police Department, the court situated the plaintiff—a “citizen
journalist” who specifically went to the site of an Occupy Wall Street protest
to film the demonstration—as one of the many protestors present at the
event.213 When establishing a First Amendment retaliation claim, the
plaintiff’s “self-described status as a ‘citizen journalist,’ rather than an
ordinary citizen at the event, is irrelevant to the legal analysis.”214
This framing could have broader repercussions for these “citizen
journalists.” As one later case described the details of Sullivan, the “plaintiff
was one among a number of similarly situated protestors filming events and
there was no evidence that the police otherwise arrested protestors
indiscriminately.”215 This type of analysis would likely preclude any “citizen
journalist” from qualifying for the Nieves exemption to the probable cause
requirement.216
C. Protest medics—protected conduct and probable cause
Courts have consistently rejected arguments that organized medics
appearing at protests invoke any First Amendment protections distinct from
protestors. In Marom v. City of New York, for example, the court found that it
was reasonable to infer that a “volunteer street medic” at an Occupy Wall
Street protest was present “with the intention of supporting the OWS
movement and its political message.”217 The court found it plausible that the
211
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216
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Cobarobio v. Midland County, No. 13-CV-00111, 2015 WL 13608102, at *24 n.8, *26 (W.D. Tex.
Jan. 7, 2015), aff’d, 695 Fed.Appx. 88 (5th Cir. 2017).
Day v. City of Baton Rouge, No. 17-328-EWD, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222317, at *6 (M.D. La.
Nov. 30, 2020). Plaintiff’s other forms of protest included his presence at the protest and “talking
sh*t” to police. Id.
Sullivan v. Metro. Transit Auth. Police Dep’t, No. 13 Civ. 7677 (NRB), 2017 WL 4326058, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017).
Id. at *8 n.9.
Abujayyab v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 10080, 2018 WL 3978122, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20,
2018).
But see Day, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222317, at *44–45 (finding that a case where a plaintiff was
arrested while filming police could “fit the exception to the no-probable-cause requirement
announced in Nieves” because “[a] reasonable jury could conclude that the only difference between
Plaintiff and the protestors who were not arrested is that Plaintiff was directing his protected speech
at the officers, rather than just present at the protest.”).
Marom v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-2017, 2016 WL 916424, at *2, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7,
2016), on reconsideration in part, No. 15-CV-2017, 2016 WL 5900217 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2016).
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medic, one of the plaintiffs in the case, “intended to convey a particularized
message of political support for OWS” by physically associating with other
people involved with the movement—even if they “were not shouting or
holding signs.”218
Similarly, in Wise v. City of Portland, the court rejected a group of protest
medics’ “novel position” that “rendering medical aid to support and advance
a protest is itself a form of constitutionally protected expression.’”219 Instead,
the court found that protest medics, in short, protest, and therefore do not
have “unique recognition under the First Amendment beyond that afforded
any individual who attends a protest.”220
The court in Wise also rejected practical arguments put forth by the
plaintiffs to charge law enforcement with distinguishing between medics and
protestors. The judge emphasized that protest medics “lack a distinct
uniform, instead identifying themselves primarily with crosses taped or
painted onto ordinary clothing.”221 Additionally, the court noted that as part
of the medics’ role at protests, they will “enmesh themselves with other
protesters” to provide aid or may even “deliberately stand in the spaces
between law enforcement and the protesters.”222 Because of these
considerations, “protest medics’ actions and appearance would not obviously
distinguish them from a diverse crowd of protesters.”223
Notably, the protest medics bringing the case in Wise were from Portland,
where other federal courts have established and upheld requirements for law
enforcement to exempt journalists and legal observers from the dispersal
orders in the city. Here, however, the relief being sought would create “an
unworkable distinction between the ordinary protestor, who is subject to
dispersal orders, and the protest medics, who are not.”224
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Id. at *10.
Wise v. City of Portland, 483 F. Supp. 3d 956, 967 (D. Or. 2020) (quoting the Electronic Case File).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 972.
Id. at 971; see also id. at 967–68 (“This lack of uniformity cuts against the proposition that
protest medics are readily identifiable, especially when considering the chaotic situations where
officers must distinguish between protest medics and other protesters through split-second
judgments.”).
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V. THE ‘FLOYD CASELAW’ AND FUTURE FIRST AMENDMENT TRENDS
Dozens of cases now make up the “Floyd Caselaw,” and the group is
growing every day. Underlying many of these decisions is the unfortunate
reality of future demonstrations against police actions and the inevitability
that protestors—as well as journalists—will once again be face to face with
officers.225 As one court noted, a year and a half after George Floyd’s
murder, “the likelihood of demonstrations and protests persists” and
therefore “the threat of imminent future interactions between [police] and
members of the press persists.”226
Two trends emerging from these decisions signal a broadening
acceptance of judicially-created press rights distinct from the general public.
First, judges have recognized the blatant unconstitutionality of police
targeting journalists in a series of municipality-focused Monell claims.
Second, courts across the country have created or enshrined press
exemptions from otherwise-enforceable dispersal orders through judiciallyimposed injunctive orders. Both of these sets of cases seem to acknowledge
the impact of widespread attacks on the press in the summer of 2020 and
likely foreshadow a new judicial reality where law enforcement is on notice
that officers cannot go after members of the press for doing their jobs.
A. ‘Floyd Caselaw’ Monell claims put cities on notice
In addition to bringing § 1983 claims against individual officers, plaintiffs
can also seek to vindicate their First Amendment rights through a suit directly
against the city, under what’s become known as a Monell claim. Several of
the “Floyd Caselaw” decisions have allowed these claims against
municipalities to go forward, often tying in contemporary coverage of the
widespread attacks on the press as evidence that a certain police department
should be “on notice” for requiring proper press interactions.
225
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See, e.g., Alsaada v. City of Columbus, No. 2:20-CV-3431, 2021 WL 1725554, at *32 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 30, 2021), modified sub nom. Alsaada v. City of Columbus, Ohio, No. 2:20-CV-3431, 2021 WL
3375834 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 2021) (“As long [as] police killings are met with public outrage and
protest … there remains a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs will face the same challenged conduct
again”); Samaha v. City of Minneapolis, 525 F. Supp. 3d 933, 945–46 (D. Minn. 2021) (“Although
Plaintiffs have not pleaded when they will again participate in protests in Minneapolis, Plaintiffs are
not required to divine the date when the next controversy will spark widespread outrage in this
community”); Gaffett v. City of Oakland, No. 21-CV-02881, 2021 WL 4503456, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2021) (noting that police brutality cases “are all too common” and “there is a high chance
there will be similar incidents to protest”).
Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302, 2021 WL 5003065, at *9 (D. Minn. Oct. 28,
2021).
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The Supreme Court has found that a municipality can be liable for a
“deliberate indifference” failure-to-train Monell claim when city is on “actual
or constructive notice that a particular omission in their training program
causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights” and keeps the
program without remedying the issue.227 “The city’s ‘policy of inaction’ in
light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the
functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the
Constitution.’”228
In practice, as at least two circuits have elaborated, this can be proven by
meeting a set of distinct factors. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s guidance,
the Second Circuit and Third Circuit follow a three-part test as articulated
in Carter v. City of Philadelphia. In order for a plaintiff to allege “deliberate
indifference” and demonstrate a municipality’s failure to train or supervise
they need to prove that “(1) municipal policymakers know that employees
will confront a particular situation; (2) the situation involves a difficult choice
or a history of employees mishandling; and (3) the wrong choice by an
employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.”229
This is the test the court used in Martínez v. City of Asbury Park, finding that
a journalist’s—Gustavo Martínez, mentioned above—failure-to-train
allegations met each criterion. For part one, the court found it plausible that
the municipality “knew that their officers would ‘confront a particular
situation’—namely, journalists or reporters covering a protest.”230
Additionally, this situation would involve “a difficult task—namely, how to
identify and interact with reporters during and after a protest.”231 And,
finally, the court gave credence to Martínez’ allegation that “failures to
navigate interactions with reporters properly could ‘frequently cause
deprivation of constitutional rights.’”232 Thus, Martínez was able to move
forward with his claim against Asbury Park.
An examination of the court’s reasoning reveals a series of findings that
may signal broader acceptance of standalone press rights. The court cited
several pertinent facts in evaluating the first two criteria, finding that the city
reasonably should have known that their officers would confront reporters
227
228
229
230
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232

Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011).
Id. at 61–62.
Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Walker v. City of New
York, 974 F.2d 293, 297–98 (2d Cir. 1992)).
Martínez v. City of Asbury Park, No. 20-8710, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *16 (D.N.J. Mar.
5, 2021).
Id. at *16–17.
Id. at *17.
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covering a protest—effectively, that they were “on notice” of this particular
situation—and the decision of how to handle these journalists would require
“more than the application of common sense.”233 Of note was that Martínez
had a press pass from the New Jersey Police Press Credential Program, which
“ensures that law enforcement in New Jersey can identify journalists and
tailor their interactions with them,” and that Asbury Park’s emergency
curfew in place that night exempted “credentialed members of the media.”234
These facts could likely apply to most journalists arrested while covering
protests. As described above, press passes and curfew exemptions are
standard practice for the professional press. This creates a situation where
any municipality should be aware police officers will encounter journalists at
a protest and that these encounters require special considerations. Similarly,
regardless of whether the specific circuit has outlined a broad right to record
or otherwise engage with matters of public interest, journalists’ conduct is
uniformly acknowledged to be protected by the First Amendment. Members
of the press are well situated to show that an unconstitutional arrest is
emblematic of a broader unlawful policy or failure-to-train, especially when
they have a press pass and are exempted from general regulations.235
The Martínez court also highlighted something potentially less obvious in
finding the journalist could move forward with his claim, which could be a
potential harbinger for similar cases. In finding the police department should
have been on notice, the court noted that “[o]ther journalists were ostensibly
unlawfully arrested at protests around the country in summer 2020.”236 The
widespread coverage of this unconstitutional practice was evidently enough
to make municipalities aware of the need to create a policy response. This
could perhaps be the silver lining of the scores of targeted attacks and
unlawful arrests that journalists faced while covering protests in 2020—it put
cities and police departments across the country on notice.
This language in Martínez recalls similar reasoning in other cases allowing
Monell claims following the police response to the protests in 2020. Linda
Tirado’s lawsuit against the Minneapolis Police Department, for example,
was able to go forward in part because the city allegedly was aware of
unlawful targeting of journalists through “broad reporting by news outlets”
233
234
235
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Id. (quoting Walker, 974 F.2d at 297).
Id. at *16; see also id. at *17 (“The existence of the New Jersey Police Press Credential Program
suggests that fulfilling those obligations calls for more than common sense.”).
See, e.g., Tirado v. City of Minneapolis, 521 F. Supp. 3d 833, 842 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding that
“disparaging comments made by [police] to two journalists about their press passes and exemption
from the curfew” was evidence that pointed to a “pattern of misconduct.”).
Martínez, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43944, at *16.

April 2022]

THE PRESS AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

627

and “social media monitoring efforts.”237 This was sufficient to allege that
the city knew about the unofficial unconstitutional policy, and stayed the
course. Similarly, a court allowed a Monell suit to proceed against the
municipal government of Louisville, Kentucky—accusing the police
department of using aggressive force against journalists reporting on local
protests—because the city was on notice “of a pattern of constitutional
violations” based on “local and national news articles” on officers’ tactics.238
In all three of the above cases, the courts acknowledged that media
reporting from the time of the protests themselves could play a substantive
role in establishing Monell claims against a city. Each decision allowing the
Monell claims to go forward credited contemporaneous accounts of police
misconduct—locally in Minneapolis and Louisville, and nationally in Asbury
Park—as putting government officials on notice that this was something
necessary to address. This stands in contrast to another federal court decision
from a few years before, where a judge found that a police department would
not have the knowledge necessary to meet a deliberate indifference standard
for not addressing policies for filming police activity just based on a few
cases—one national and two within the circuit—involving individuals
filming the police.239
In Basler v. Barron—a 2017 case where a plaintiff sued Harris County,
Texas which includes Houston—the court found that even assuming the
county had knowledge of these past cases, it was too much of a leap to claim
that “mere knowledge of these events gives rise to a conclusion that Harris
County was deliberately indifferent and consciously disregarded any risk that
there might be retaliation for filming.”240
In essence, these past incidents were not enough to establish that the
police department would have been on notice for a failure to train claim. It
seems likely, however, that following the high-profile attacks on members of
the media during 2020’s protests, this case may have come to a different
conclusion if decided now. Journalists are well positioned to argue—and
courts should find—that any municipality in the country is now on notice.
237
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Tirado, 521 F. Supp. 3d at 843.
Scott v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 503 F. Supp. 3d. 532, 533–34 (W.D. Ky. 2020).
See Basler v. Barron, No. CV H-15-2254, 2017 WL 477573, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2017)
(concluding that “Basler failed to provide the evidence required to establish failure to train was a
policy of the department.”).
Id.; see also Martinez v. City of Santa Rosa, 499 F. Supp. 3d 748, 749 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissing
a municipal liability claim for First Amendment violations because “generic, boilerplate terms”
were insufficient “to hold city liable under § 1983 for alleged retaliation by individual officers against
protestors based on their speech or filming”)
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B. “Floyd Caselaw” injunctive relief establishes press privileges
Someday, a court may need to decide whether the First Amendment protects
journalists and authorized legal observers, as distinct from the public
generally, from having to comply with an otherwise lawful order to disperse
from city streets when journalists and legal observers seek to observe,
document, and report the conduct of law enforcement personnel; but today
is not that day.241

Although this theoretically remains an open question, it is axiomatic
within modern First Amendment jurisprudence that members of the press do
not receive special rights or privileges due to their profession. One of the
most intriguing legal determinations to emerge from the 2020
demonstrations is an unusual line of cases stemming from protests in
Portland. The cases appear to have established a dispersal order exemption
for journalists as a matter of judge-made law.242 As part of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), the first of these cases—Woodstock v. City of
Portland—exempts journalists from dispersal orders and prevents local law
enforcement from “arresting, threatening to arrest, or using physical force
directed against any person whom they know or reasonably should know is
a Journalist.”243 In essence, the court created a dispersal order carve out for
members of the press.
Although this ruling was expanded to include protections from federal
law enforcement in Index Newspapers244 and formalized in an agreement with
the city,245 granting these rights to journalists flies in the face of established
media law norms. The exemption for journalists in Portland “seems to run
afoul of the principle that the press does not have special status from other
speakers when it comes to what they can say and their access to spaces,”

241
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Index Newspapers v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1126 (D. Or. 2020).
Although the injunction underlying this exemption remains in place, a district court judge signaled
in January 2022 that the injunction could be dissolved if the Ninth Circuit remands the case, citing
“the significantly reduced number and size of protests in Portland” and “a significantly reduced
federal response involving the use of force.” Index Newspapers LLC v. City of Portland, No. 3:20CV-1035-SI, 2022 WL 72124, at *6 (D. Or. Jan. 7, 2022)
Woodstock v. City of Portland, No. 3:20 Civ. 1035-SI, 2020 WL 3621179, at *4 (D. Or. July 2,
2020) (establishing that journalists “shall not be required to disperse following the issuance of an
order to disperse, and . . . shall not be subject to arrest for not dispersing following the issuance of
an order to disperse.”).
Index Newspapers, 480 F. Supp. 3d at 1120.
Id. at 1157.
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according to Florida International University law professor Howard
Wasserman.246
Rather than standing out as an oddity, however, the Portland cases now
stand as the first of several federal court injunctive orders granting the press
special protections against police action. To understand how much this
thinking has changed in less than a year, it’s worthwhile to examine two
rulings from Goyette v. City of Minneapolis—one released in June 2020 and one
released in April 2021. In the June decision, the court found that a TRO
that would enjoin police officers from arresting and threatening members of
the news media was unnecessary under the circumstances.247 While there
were “extensive allegations of egregious conduct by law enforcement directed
at members of the news media,” the court found that no facts “plausibly
demonstrate that such conduct is likely to recur imminently.”248
The April decision came out quite differently, as the court granted a
TRO exempting journalists from general dispersal orders and forbidding
police from using force against members of the press.249 Notably, the court
rejected the city’s argument that journalists have “no right to ‘remain in an
active dispersal area,’” instead finding that a dispersal order that includes
journalists is not “narrowly tailored.”250
In contrast to the findings of the June 2020 decision, the harm journalists
may face at the hands of police officers “is no longer speculative or a mere
possibility”—“Rather, the protests have continued and the harm exists.”251
The court cited “the events that have occurred over the last year” as evidence
for the TRO, seemingly taking the likelihood of constitutional violations as a
given.252 The “demonstrations and protests likely will continue” and
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Howard Wasserman, (Update) Grab Your Fedora, We Are All Journalists Now and Other Thoughts on the
Portland
TRO,
PRAWFSBLAWG
(July
24,
2020,
8:26
AM),
https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2020/07/grab-your-fedora-we-are-all-journalistsnow-and-other-thoughts-on-the-portland-tro.html#more [https://perma.cc/T7BG-CHKK].
Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20 Civ. 1302, 2020 WL 3056705, at *19 (D. Minn. June 9,
2020).
Id. at *3–4.
See Goyette, 338 F.R.D. at 121 (enjoining the Minneapolis police department from “arresting,
threatening to arrest, or using physical force . . . directed against any person whom they know or
reasonably should know is a Journalist . . . unless the State Defendants have probable cause to believe
that such individual has committed a crime”).
Id. at 109, 116.
Id. at 119.
Id.
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journalists “cannot document these ongoing events of public importance”
without the court intervening in police action.253
These decisions following the George Floyd protests make it clearer than
ever that certain words, actions, and attire signify that an individual is a
member of the press. The Portland TRO lists what qualifies as being an
“indicia of being a Journalist,” which ostensibly creates a badge of protection
against police action. The list in Woodstock includes, while not limiting what
could count as an indicia, “visual identification as a member of the press,
such as by carrying a professional or authorized press pass or wearing a
professional or authorized press badge or distinctive clothing that identifies
the wearer as a member of the press.”254 Similarly, Goyette finds that indicia
that establishes a journalist’s “visual identification” includes a press
credential—such as a pass or badge—as well as “distinctive clothing that
identifies the wearer as a member of the press.”255 Another recent TRO
issued by a federal court, while not expressly granting dispersal order
exemptions for these groups, takes this process one step further. In Alsaada v.
City of Columbus, the court ordered police officers to “recognize that
individuals legitimately displaying ‘press,’ ‘media,’ ‘reporter,’ ‘paramedic,’
‘medic,’ ‘legal observer’ . . . are permitted to be present in a position enabling
them to record at protests and/or to intervene to assist individuals who
appear to have been injured.”256 The court also granted protections to
citizen journalists, ruling that “all individuals, regardless of their occupation
or nonviolent activity, are permitted to record at protests or whenever any
police officer interacts with the public.”257
There is a strong argument that these types of arrangements work. As
the court noted in Index Newspapers, where it applied a similar TRO to federal
law enforcement, the fact that the City of Portland did not ask to modify the
original restrictions when adopting it as a primarily injunction “is compelling
evidence that exempting journalists . . . is workable.”258 Additionally, a later
253
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Id. The judicial order at the heart of the Goyette cases has subsequently been converted to a
preliminary injunction—see Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2021
WL 5003065 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2021)—and enshrined as a monitored injunction under a
settlement agreement—see Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2022
WL 370161, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2022).
Woodstock v. City of Portland, No. 3:20 Civ. 1035-SI, 2020 WL 3621179, at *4 (D. Or. July 2,
2020).
Goyette, 338 F.R.D. at 122.
Alsaada v. City of Columbus, No. 20 Civ. 3431, 2021 WL 1725554, at *47 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 30,
2021).
Id.
Index Newspapers v. City of Portland, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1148 (D. Or. 2020).
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decision on the order featured expert testimony establishing that law
enforcement personnel “are able to protect public safety without dispersing
journalists” and “can differentiate press from protesters, even in the heat of
crowd control.”259 Somewhat ironically, law enforcement may have
inadvertently provided courts with evidence of the efficacy of these
injunctions by targeting journalists. As one court examining the Goyette order
found, “numerous examples of law enforcement officers specifically and
intentionally targeting identifiable members of the press, both verbally and
physically … belies any suggestion that members of the press were somehow
indistinguishable from others.”260
The TROs that have come out following the Portland decisions
demonstrate that this may be a lasting trend. Citing to these cases, Goyette
outlines a preliminary injunction framework proven to be effective—in
circumstances where police forces were using force and arrest against
journalists, courts “have required members of the press to adequately identify
themselves, refrain from impeding law enforcement activities, and comply
with all laws other than general dispersal orders.”261 It seems likely courts
will continue to implement similar injunctions, regardless of whether the
privileges granted directly derive from First Amendment principles.
CONCLUSION
Members of the press traditionally occupy an odd role at protests. On
the one hand, journalists are entitled to no different rights than any other
individual, including no special access to newsworthy events. On the other
hand, however, government officials, police officers, and judges all seemed
to recognize that journalists have a distinct role in American society—
therefore, it may be reasonable to give them some leeway while doing their
job.
The protests following George Floyd’s murder in 2020 upended any
protections the press thought they had. While it was not uncommon for
journalists to be arrested at protests, the U.S. had rarely if ever seen the
widespread targeting of clearly marked members of the press—as well as the
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Id. at 1136.
Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302 (WMW/DTS), 2021 WL 5003065, at *8 (D.
Minn. Oct. 28, 2021), superseded sub nom. Goyette v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-CV-1302
(WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 370161 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2022).
Goyette, 338 F.R.D. at 118.
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widespread condemnation of police action by commentators, activists, and
government officials.
These instances of police violence against the press may have pushed the
judiciary to create certain judge-made protections for the press. The implied
notice in recent Monell claims and the willingness of judges to issue
injunctions granting journalists distinct privileges both signal an emerging
recognition of unique press rights, in contrast to traditionally held First
Amendment principles. Courts may not feel limited to offering these
protections solely to the press—rather, legal observers, citizen journalists,
and medics could all be entitled to judicially-enacted carve outs.
Judges should not hesitate to acknowledge the distinct roles of these
groups and enact protections against police retaliation. The “Floyd
Caselaw” is only growing and will hopefully continue to provide decisions
that allow for the safe performance of First Amendment protected activity.
These judicial protections should not stop at the press, but deserve to be
extended to other groups such as legal observers, citizen journalists, and
medics. After all, the world only knows the truth of how George Floyd died
“because citizens standing on a sidewalk exercised their First Amendment
rights and filmed a police officer.”262
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Index Newspapers, 977 F. 3d at 830.

